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Abstract
The Bank of Canada is one of very few central banks that has made records of the intraday timing
of its intervention operations available to researchers. The authors investigate the effectiveness of
sterilized intervention in the Canadian dollar exchange rate market over the period January 1995
to September 1998. They employ an event study methodology and different criteria for success,
and use both daily data and high-frequency (intraday) intervention and exchange rate data. The
time period covers two distinct intervention regimes, characterized by mechanistic and
discretionary intervention, respectively. Furthermore, the authors address the issue of currency co-
movements by carrying out the analysis using both the readily observable Canadian dollar/U.S.
dollar exchange rate and the Canadian dollar/U.S. dollar exchange rate adjusted for general
currency co-movements against the U.S. dollar. When they analyze the high-frequency data, the
authors ﬁnd evidence that intervention systematically affects movements in the Canadian dollar/
U.S. dollar exchange rate and in the desired direction, along with some evidence that intervention
is associated with a reduction of exchange rate volatility. When investigating exchange rate
movements around intervention events using daily data, the authors ﬁnd some evidence
supportive of effectiveness. These effects, however, are weakened when adjusting for currency co-
movements against the U.S. dollar.
JEL classiﬁcation: E58, F31, G14, G15
Bank classiﬁcation: Exchange rates; Financial markets
Résumé
La Banque du Canada est l’une des rares banques centrales à mettre à la disposition des
chercheurs des statistiques sur le moment de la journée où ses interventions ont lieu sur le marché
des changes. Les auteurs évaluent l’efﬁcacité des interventions stérilisées menées sur le marché
du dollar canadien entre janvier 1995 et septembre 1998. Privilégiant une approche
événementielle et retenant différents critères de réussite, ils utilisent des données tant
quotidiennes qu’intrajournalières sur les interventions et le taux de change. La période examinée
englobe deux régimes distincts : l’un se caractérise par des interventions automatiques et l’autre
par des interventions discrétionnaires. Les auteurs prennent aussi en compte l’incidence des
covariations générales des monnaies en faisant porter leur analyse à la fois sur le taux de change
$ CAN/$ É.-U. directement observé et sur une variante de celui-ci corrigé des covariations
d’autres monnaies par rapport au dollar américain. Lorsqu’ils se servent de données
intrajournalières pour étudier l’évolution du taux de change avant et après l’intervention, les
auteurs constatent que celle-ci a un effet systématique dans le sens souhaité sur les mouvements
du dollar canadien; certains résultats laissent également croire que l’intervention s’accompagne
d’une réduction de la volatilité du taux de change. Lorsque les données utilisées sont
quotidiennes, l’intervention semble donner les effets voulus. Ceux-ci s’atténuent cependant dès
que l’on tient compte des covariations des monnaies vis-à-vis du dollar américain.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E58, F31, G14, G15
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Taux de change; Marchés ﬁnanciers1   
1.  Introduction 
This paper studies the effectiveness of sterilized intervention in the Canadian dollar/U.S. dollar 
exchange rate (CAD/USD) over the period January 1995 to September 1998 using official, non-
public intervention data provided by the Bank of Canada (BoC). The BoC has not intervened in the 
CAD/USD since that time. The data provide details by transaction, including the time when the 
intervention occurred, and allow us to study the impact of intervention at both the daily and the 
intraday frequency.
1  
The data set and time period under study are of particular interest for two specific reasons. First, 
the BoC and the Swiss National Bank, to the best of our knowledge, are the only central banks that 
have made data on the intraday timing of their intervention operations available to researchers. The 
BoC intervention data are not publicly available, and  have been explored  in only a limited number 
of studies. Second, the time period under study covers two distinct intervention regimes. During the 
first regime, which covers the period from January 1995 to mid-April 1995, the BoC intervened 
based on a mechanistic, rules-based framework that was well understood by market participants. 
Intervention was designed to smooth movements in the exchange rate, not to target a level for the 
currency, with movements of a certain size in the CAD/USD triggering intervention. Appreciations 
and depreciations of the currency generated the same response. This approach to intervention 
resisted all trends in the currency and led to intervention on as many as 50 per cent of business days 
prior to April 1995. On 12 April 1995, a new intervention regime was adopted, designed to 
increase the impact of intervention by reducing its frequency, increasing the magnitude, allowing 
                                                  
1 For surveys of the intervention literature, see Dominguez and Frankel (1993), Edison (1993), King (2003), and Sarno 
and Taylor (2001). 2   
more discretion on the timing, and raising the visibility when it occurred.
2 Accordingly, the data set 
under study allows for a comparison of the effectiveness of intervention between mechanistic and 
discretionary intervention operations.  
Only three studies have examined official, non-public BoC intervention  data regarding the CAD.
3 
In a study conducted shortly after  the  adoption of the new framework, Murray, Zelmer, and 
McManus (1997) examine the impact of intervention on the implied volatility of over-the-counter 
CAD/USD call options from 1992 to 1996 using daily data. They find that intervention did not 
succeed in dampening volatility, except in a few cases where intervention was unexpected and 
unusually heavy towards the end of their sample. Beattie and Fillion (1999) provide an intraday 
analysis of the impact of intervention on implied CAD/USD volatility during the period April 1995 
to January 1998. They find that mechanistic intervention was widely anticipated by the market and 
had no impact on volatility, whereas discretionary intervention was unanticipated and was 
associated with decreased volatility over short time periods. D’Souza (2002) provides a second 
high-frequency study of intervention in the CAD that tests market microstructure hypotheses.4 He 
suggests that foreign exchange dealers treat intervention by the central bank as any other customer 
order and that central banks must be able to forecast overall net customer trades at the time of 
intervention in order to be effective. In summary, the previous studies using either daily or high-
frequency data find that intervention does not succeed in reducing the volatility of the currency, 
                                                  
2 The objectives of intervention were not changed; they remained the maintenance of orderly market conditions in the 
context of a floating exchange rate system. Canada moved to a purely discretionary intervention policy in September 
1998, where intervention occurs only in the most exceptional of circumstances. Since that time, the BoC has not 
intervened in the CAD/USD. 
3 Studies of intervention by Phillips and Pippenger (1993) and Rogers and Siklos (2003) do not employ official BoC 
intervention data. Instead, they estimate the amount of daily intervention from changes in the level of foreign exchange 
reserves. 
4 See Dominguez (2003) for an empirical market microstructure analysis of U.S. Federal Reserve intervention, and 
Pasquariello (2001) for a theoretical framework. 3   
although the authors suggest that intervention that is unexpected and of greater intensity may have 
a short-term effect. 
The two existing studies using official, high-frequency data provided by the Swiss National Bank 
are of particular relevance to our study. Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) focus on (scaled) exchange 
rate changes measured between consecutive interventions and use an irregular time-series model as 
the foundation for their analysis. They find that only the first intervention on a given day matters, 
and that subsequent interventions are ineffective. In a recent contribution, Payne and Vitale (2003) 
extend the analysis of Fischer and Zurlinden (1999). Within the context of an event study approach, 
they find that intervention operations have short-run effects on the  Swiss franc ( CHF)/USD 
exchange rate from 15 minutes to up to two hours following intervention. These effects are 
strongest when intervention is leaning-with-the-wind and when intervention is concerted with other 
major central banks. Payne and Vitale also find that markets partly anticipate intervention, because 
the exchange rate returns move in the 15-minute interval prior to interventions.
5  
Unlike intervention in the CHF/USD, intervention in the CAD/USD was always against-the-wind 
and was never concerted during the sample period. In addition, the framework for intervention 
changed over the sample period, allowing for a comparison of the effects of discretionary versus 
mechanistic intervention along with a general investigation of the effects of intervention.
6 
We use an event-study framework  to analyze the effects of sterilized intervention on exchange 
rates. An event study is a very general test of a specific hypothesis and does not rely on a structural 
                                                  
5 See Pierdzioch and Stadtmann (2003) for an event study analysis of official, daily Swiss National Bank intervention 
data.  
6 The April 1995 change in the exchange rate regime was not related to conditions in the foreign exchange markets or a 
change in the conduct of monetary policy, but resulted from cumulative discussions and study over the 1990s. The 
timing of the change may therefore be viewed as orthogonal to the market conditions that trigger intervention. 4   
model of exchange rate determination. This is a desirable feature, given the lack of consensus over 
the appropriate structural exchange rate model. Payne and Vitale’s (2003) event study examines the 
two hours before and after each intervention episode using a linear regression model, where the 15-
minute percentage return is regressed on a signed indicator variable for intervention and a series of 
leads and lags of returns. This approach is not appropriate for intervention in the CAD/USD, 
because BoC intervention operations involved a number of intervention transactions that could 
continue for days or weeks at a time. Given the structure of the data at hand, we follow the event 
study approach of Fatum (2000) and Fatum and Hutchison (2003a, b ), where clusters of 
intervention are identified, and exchange rate movements before and after the event are 
investigated.
7 
Eun and Lai (2004) point out that the issue of currency co-movements has not received much 
attention in the academic literature. Currency co-movement is of potential importance to our study, 
particularly since we focus on unilateral intervention conducted in a minor currency vis-à-vis a 
major currency. Canada is a small, open economy and spot turnover in its currency represented 
only 2 per cent of daily average foreign exchange turnover in 2001 (BIS 2002).8 By contrast, spot 
turnover in the majors—the USD, the European euro (EUR), and the Japanese yen (JPY)—
represented 42 per cent, 22 per cent, and 13 per cent of spot turnover, respectively. Generalized 
movements against the USD may, therefore, mask exchange rate movements associated with BoC 
intervention operations. For example, if the CAD appreciates against the USD following a CAD 
purchase intervention, intervention may appear effective. If the USD depreciates against other 
                                                  
7 Djoudad et al. (2001) explore the time-series properties of the CAD/USD exchange rate, while Beattie and Fillion 
(1999) study the time-series properties of volatility in the CAD/USD.  
8 The relative market shares are similar using the data from the 1995 and 1998 Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
triennial surveys.  5   
currencies in general, however, there is little reason to believe that the USD depreciation can be 
ascribed to the unilateral BoC intervention. We address this concern by analyzing the effectiveness 
of intervention using a “filtered” CAD/USD, calculated as the difference between the percentage 
change in the CAD/USD and a weighted average of the percentage change in the German Deutsche 
Mark (DEM), the JPY, and the British pound sterling (GBP). The results using the “filtered” 
CAD/USD may then be compared with the results using the unfiltered or “raw” CAD/USD to 
capture the impact of currency co-movements against the USD. 
We use three criteria to test the effectiveness of intervention using both daily and high-frequency 
data. When daily data are used to investigate exchange rate movements around intervention events, 
intervention is systematically associated with a smoothing of exchange rate movements in the days 
following intervention, and with changes in the direction of the CAD/USD that begin several days 
after the intervention episode. These effects are generally weakened when the daily data for 
currency co-movements are adjusted  against the USD,  which suggests that market movements, 
rather than intervention, are responsible for part of the observed exchange rate movements. We find 
that intervention did not affect the realized price volatility of the CAD/USD. These findings are 
robust to changes in the event definition itself. Repeating the analysis on subsamples according to 
whether intervention was mechanistic or discretionary yields similar results. 
When using intraday intervention and exchange rate data, we find evidence in support of 
effectiveness when analyzing exchange rate returns (i.e., when focusing on the “direction” and the 
“smoothing” criteria of success) over the 5- through 120-minute windows. Additionally, we find 
some evidence that intervention is associated with a reduction of intraday exchange rate volatility, 
although it appears that the volatility effects are short-lived (only detectable within an hour after 
the intervention event) and not robust to adjusting for currency co-movements. 6   
The rest of this paper is organized as  follows.  Section  2  details institutional aspects of BoC 
intervention. Section 3  describes the data. Section 4 discusses the event study methodology. 
Section 5 describes the analysis based on daily intervention data. Section 6  reports the findings 
using high-frequency  (intraday) intervention data. Section 7 discusses the findings and section 8 
concludes. 
2.  Institutional Framework of Intervention 
Foreign exchange market intervention is conducted by the BoC, acting as agent for the Government 
of Canada, using the government’s holding of foreign exchange reserves in the Exchange Fund 
Account.
9 Intervention in the CAD/USD is guided by the Currency Act. Section 17(1) of the Act 
states that foreign exchange reserves may be used “to aid in the control and protection of the 
external value of the monetary unit of Canada.”10 From the standpoint of exchange rate 
intervention, the Act has been interpreted to mean maintaining an orderly market for the CAD by 
smoothing movements of the exchange rate and providing liquidity to the foreign exchange market 
when needed. The BoC intervenes in the foreign exchange markets on behalf of the federal 
government to counter disruptive short-term movements in the CAD/USD; i.e., intervention is 
aimed at managing the rate of change of the exchange rate, rather than targeting a specific level. 
This approach is consistent with “leaning against the wind” in the sense that CAD is bought (sold) 
when the CAD depreciates (appreciates) against the USD. To make sure that intervention does not 
change the quantity of money in circulation, the BoC sterilizes its purchases and sales of foreign 
reserves by depositing or withdrawing the same amount of CAD balances from the financial system 
                                                  
9 The Exchange Fund Account holds foreign reserves, such as U.S. dollars, Japanese yen, European euros, and other 
assets like Special Drawing Rights with the International Monetary Fund, and gold. 
10 The Currency Act is available at: <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/C-52/46306.html>. 7   
on a daily basis. During the 1995 to 1998 period, intervention in the CAD/USD typically took place 
during North American market hours from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. EST, but could continue overnight 
during European market hours.
11 Intervention was “passive,” with the BoC leaving offers to buy 
and sell the CAD, rather than hitting bids.  
This period under study features two distinct intervention regimes. A rules-based regime, 
characterized by a mechanical—and therefore predictable—response to exchange rate movements, 
was in place until April 1995. The BoC determined when to intervene by monitoring a 100-basis 
point  “non-intervention” band. When one end of the non-intervention band was breached, 
intervention operations (in terms of USD purchases or sales against the CAD) were conducted at 
pre-set levels of intensity, with intensity measured by the amount of intervention that occurred for 
each basis-point change in the CAD/USD. The standard amount was $4 million per basis point. 
The non-intervention band was dragged or “ratcheted” in the direction that intervention occurred 
according to  the amount and intensity of the most recent intervention operation.
12 Under this 
mechanical framework, intervention was quite persistent and would continue until the CAD/USD 
reversed direction and moved back inside the non-intervention band. In case of a highly volatile 
exchange rate market, the intensity of intervention was increased to $6 million or $8 million per 
basis point, although the timing of intervention continued to be dictated by market movements. 
Intervention during this period was typically conducted directly with dealers at the major chartered 
banks, who were instructed to keep the BoC’s intervention activity secret, although market 
participants soon found out when the BoC was “in the market.” Under this mechanistic framework, 
                                                  
11 If the currency continued to move in one direction at the end of North American trading hours, the BoC would leave 
instructions with a European agent, typically the Bank of England, to intervene on the BoC’s behalf within pre-set 
limits. 
12 The end of the non-intervention band that was breached was termed the “active side,” and the exchange rate at which 
intervention would occur was termed the “on-track” position. 8   
intervention resisted all trends, whether based on market fundamentals or technical factors. As a 
result, the BoC intervened on 40 per cent of business days from 1 January 1995 to 11 April 1995, 
and more than 70 per cent of business days from 1975 to 1988, as reported by Murray, Zelmer, and 
Williamson (1990, Table 3). 
On 12 April 1995, a revised intervention regime was introduced, designed to increase the effect of 
intervention by reducing its frequency, increasing  its magnitude, allowing more discretion on  its 
timing, and raising  its visibility when it occurred. This change followed a major review of the 
mechanistic intervention regime and reflected the growth of the currency markets as well as the 
state of the academic literature. As the Bank explained in a letter sent to  exchange market 
participants: 
[The] conclusions of this work support the idea that foreign exchange market intervention is 
most useful when used as a signalling tool. Our analysis of the current intervention 
techniques we use is that they are not as effective as they could be in this regard. This is 
largely because the frequency of our intervention tends to reduce the “newsworthiness” of 
the fact that we are in the market. Also, given the volumes in today’s market, the intensity 
of our current intervention probably adds little in terms of enhancing market liquidity.
13  
The non-intervention band was widened to 140 basis points and was rebased daily around the 
4 p.m. North American closing exchange rate. The daily rebasing reduced the frequency of 
intervention, because the currency would have had to move by 70 basis points in either direction 
before intervention would continue. This change allowed for moderate trends in the movement of 
                                                  
13 Letter from Don Stephenson, Associate Adviser, Bank of Canada, 5 April 1995. 9   
the currency that were not resisted by intervention, and reduced the frequency of intervention to 
less than 10 per cent of business days in 1996. The visibility of intervention was increased by 
increasing the standard intensity of intervention to $8 million per basis point, leading to larger 
intervention amounts when it occurred. Intervention was primarily conducted through foreign 
exchange brokers, who were instructed to announce BoC intervention as soon as the first 
transaction of the day had been completed. T he new framework introduced greater discretion, 
although it maintained elements of the mechanical framework. The wider non-intervention band 
continued to be dragged up or down intraday in response to each intervention operation. But the 
timing of intervention could be varied to allow the BoC to intervene earlier and with greater 
intensity in response to what were believed to be destabilizing movements of the exchange rate. 
During such turbulent periods, the non-intervention band could be reset at half the distance from its 
normal setting, allowing the BoC to intervene sooner, and the intensity of intervention could be 
increased as the situation demanded. A decision to reset the band in this fashion was made by the 
BoC and authorized by Canada’s Department of Finance.  
This change in the intervention framework reflected a growing concern that excessive one-way 
currency movements due to currency speculation could be damaging for the economy, even under a 
floating exchange rate regime. Such bandwagon behaviour could become self-fulfilling if left 
unchecked, creating financial uncertainty and complicating the conduct of monetary policy.  
In practice, Table 1 shows that intervention remained mechanistic for the rest of 1995 and most of 
1996, with few interventions where the timing was discretionary. Over this period, Figure 1 shows 
that the CAD moved sideways with no strong trends dominating the currency. Beginning in late 
1996, the CAD began to depreciate steadily against the USD along with other major currencies. 
This trend was partly driven by the events in Asia, where currency pressure forced a number of 10   
East Asian countries to float their currencies. The Asian financial crisis continued until the end of 
1997, but global foreign exchange markets remained volatile throughout 1998 with the collapse of 
Long Term Capital Management and the default of Russia on its foreign currency debt in the 
summer of 1998. As a result, the timing of intervention in the CAD/USD was entirely discretionary 
from mid-1997 until September 1998, with intervention taking place on one-quarter of the business 
days in 1997 and 1998. The magnitude of intervention increased as the pace of the devaluation of 
the CAD increased. 
In September 1998, the intervention policy was changed due to the perceived inability of 
intervention to resist movements in the exchange rate caused by changes in fundamental factors. 
Canada’s current policy is to intervene in foreign exchange markets on a discretionary, rather than 
a systematic, basis, and only in the most exceptional circumstances. As the BoC’s website states:  
Intervention might be considered if there were signs of a serious near-term market 
breakdown (e.g., extreme price volatility with both buyers and sellers increasingly 
unwilling to transact), indicating a severe lack of liquidity in the Canadian-dollar market. It 
might also be considered if extreme currency movements seriously threatened the 
conditions that support sustainable long-term growth of the Canadian economy; and the 
goal would be to help stabilize the currency and to signal a commitment to back up the 
intervention with further policy actions, as necessary.14 
The BoC has not intervened in the CAD/USD since September 1998, although it did participate in 
concerted intervention against the EUR in September 2000, coordinated by the European Central 
                                                  
14 Details on the current intervention policy are available at: < http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/backgrounders/bg-
e2.html>. 11   
Bank. More detail on the evolution of the BoC intervention framework is provided in Chiu (2003), 
D’Souza (2002), Murray, Zelmer, and McManus (1997), and Murray, Zelmer, and Williamson 
(1990).  
3.  Data 
This study covers the period January 1995 to September 1998 and employs non-public, high-
frequency (intraday) intervention data in the CAD/USD, made available by the BoC. The 
intervention data represent the population of intervention transactions over this period, and include 
the date, the time, and the transaction size (in millions of USD) for each intervention transaction.
15 
During the full sample period, 2 January 1995 to 30 September 1998, the BoC carried out 1,530 
intervention transactions (on a total of 151 intervention days). Of these transactions, 371 (on a total 
of 40 intervention days) took place during the intervention program that ended on 11 April 1995.
16  
The individual intervention transactions ranged in magnitude from USD  2 million to 
USD 138 million, with an average amount of USD 18 million and a median amount of 
USD 20 million.17 On intervention days, an average of 21 transactions occurred, with the number 
of transactions ranging from a low of one to a high of 83 (on 7 August 1998).  
Table 1 provides an overview of the intervention data, with the daily data summarized in Panels A 
and B and the high-frequency (intraday) data summarized in Panels C and D. Based on the high-
                                                  
15 Since the intervention data set is not publicly available, we do not display or describe, in particular, the intervention 
magnitudes in great detail. 
16 The starting date of the sample is determined by data availability, because the BoC has not maintained records of 
intraday intervention transactions prior to January 1995. 
17 Individual transaction magnitude may contain limited information, because intervention transactions conducted 
through foreign exchange brokers were often bundled together to reduce the number of individual trade “tickets.” The 
event study methodology employed in this study does not rely on information regarding transaction size and uses 
bid/ask rates rather than transaction prices in order to facilitate the investigation of exchange rate movements across 
different window lengths. 12   
frequency data, 45.4 per cent of intervention transactions were discretionary  and the remaining 
54.6 per cent of transactions were carried out in accordance with the mechanistic policy 
framework. Table 1 also shows that the number of interventions that occurred due to a mechanical 
rebasing of the non-intervention band dominated in 1995, while the number of discretionary 
interventions increased steadily from 1996 onwards. Additionally, Table 1 shows that the number 
of purchases and sales were largely balanced in 1995, while the ratio of purchases to sales 
increased dramatically over the following years. 
The analysis employs both daily and intraday data on the CAD/USD, DEM/USD, GBP/USD, and 
JPY/USD exchange rates. The daily exchange rate data contain quotes recorded at noon (EST) 
obtained from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. The intraday exchange rate series 
are purchased from Olsen and Associates. The intraday data provide the spot rate at the end of 
every 5-minute interval over a 24-hour period for each of the aforementioned exchange rates.
18 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the CAD/USD exchange rate.  Figure 2 shows the CAD/USD 
juxtaposed against an equally weighted basket of the DEM, the GBP, and the JPY vis-à-vis the 
USD, with all exchange rates indexed to 100 as of the start of January 1995. The CAD appreciated 
against the USD in early 1995, but then began depreciating from 1997 onwards. The basket of 
major currencies appreciated more rapidly against the USD in early 1995, but then depreciated 
during late 1995, with another rapid depreciation in early 1997. The basket of currencies then 
appreciated sharply in mid-1998. 
                                                  
18 The bid and offer rates are provided for intervals where an actual trade takes place, while a representative quote is 
used for other periods. There is little time variation in the bid/ask spreads and the analysis focuses on the bid rates. 
 13   
4.  Methodology 
The starting point for an event study is to define the event of interest and to identify the periods 
over which the asset price is examined (the “event windows”).
19 In this context, the event is defined 
as an episode of intervention days or a cluster of intervention operations. The event windows are 
the pre-event days or minutes and the post-event days or minutes during which the CAD/USD 
exchange rate movements are analyzed. 
We study intervention at both the daily frequency and at the intraday or high frequency. When 
focusing on the daily data, an event is defined as a period of days with official intervention in the 
CAD/USD in one direction (in terms of purchases or sales), interspaced by a fixed maximum 
number of consecutive business days of no intervention (the “tranquility” period that can be 
allowed for while still considering the surrounding days of intervention to be part of the same 
event). Given the structure of the intervention data at hand and following Fatum and Hutchison 
(2003a, b ), we choose a “tranquility” period of five days for our baseline results and vary this 
number to check the robustness of our results. We study changes in the CAD/USD during pre- and 
post-event window lengths ranging from  1 to  10 business days.
20 When focusing on the high-
frequency  data,  we define an event as a cluster of individual intervention operations in one 
direction, with at most 30 minutes between transactions. As with the daily analysis, we check the 
robustness of the definition of an intervention event by varying the length of the “tranquility” time 
                                                  
19 For a detailed description of the event study methodology applied to the analysis of foreign exchange market 
intervention, see Fatum (2000) and Fatum and Hutchison (2003a, b).  
20 In order to limit the instances when pre- and post-event windows overlap, the window lengths are not expanded 
beyond 10 days. A small number of events, however, are interspaced such that an event in one direction (e.g., USD 
sales) is immediately followed by an event in the opposite direction (e.g., USD purchases), thereby leading to overlaps 
(regardless of the window length) as well as pre- and post-event windows “contaminated” by the preceding or 
succeeding event. In order to ensure that none of these occurrences impacted our results, the analysis was redone after 
dropping the potentially problematic events, and the results were unchanged.  14   
period. We study changes in the CAD/USD during pre- and post-event window lengths ranging 
from 5 to 120 minutes. 
As pointed out by, for example, Dominguez and Frankel (1993), there is no convention on what 
constitutes successful intervention. For this reason, we apply three alternative criteria for success. 
The first criterion is simply whether the direction of the movement in the exchange rate is the same 
as the direction in which the BoC was intervening; e.g., does the value of the CAD relative to the 
USD increase after CAD are purchased? Although the stated objective of the CAD intervention 
was to maintain orderly market conditions, and not to target a level for the exchange rate, this 
criterion is standard in studies of foreign exchange intervention (see Fatum 2000 for a discussion). 
It is also consistent with the way that the non-intervention band operated over the sample period. 
This measure of success is referred to as the “direction” criterion, and is formally expressed as 
follows: An event is a success if either  
0 { > i E  and  } 0 > D + i S  or  0 { < i E  and  } 0 < D + i S , 
where  i E  is the total amount of central bank intervention (positive values represent p urchases of 
USD, negative values represent sales of USD) during event i, and  + D i S  is the percentage change in 
the CAD/USD during the associated post-event window.  
As previously noted, the stated motivation for intervention in the CAD is to maintain orderly 
markets; thus, it may be the case that intervention operations are carried out for the purpose of 
smoothing exchange rate movements, rather than for affecting the direction of exchange rate 
movements. The second criterion—the “smoothing” criterion—classifies an event as successful 
when intervention is associated with a smoothing of the exchange rate movement, as follows:  
{the event is a success according to the “direction” criterion} or 15   
0 { > i E  and  } - + D > D i i S S  or  0 { < i E  and  } - + D < D i i S S , 
where  - D i S  is the CAD/USD change (in per cent) during the associated pre-event window. 
The third criterion compares the volatility before and after each event, where volatility is measured 
by the realized variance of the CAD/USD, as opposed to the implied volatility studied  by Beattie 
and Fillion (1999).










i-) denotes the realized post-event variance (pre-event variance) of the CAD/USD 
exchange rate.  Note that the direction of intervention does not affect the results,  because 
intervention operations involving either CAD purchases or sales are classified as successful when 
volatility is lower after the event relative to before the event. For the daily data analysis, we 
calculate the variance of the CAD/USD over the relevant window length (1 through 10 days), using 
the 5-minute high-frequency exchange rate data. For the high-frequency analysis, we calculate the 
variance of the exchange rate during the 30, 60, 90, and 120 minutes preceding and succeeding 
each event, and compare the volatility patterns before and after in the same fashion as with the 
daily data volatility analysis. 
Eun and Lai (2004) document systematic co-movement patterns across several currencies, in 
particular vis-à-vis the USD, and, to a lesser extent vis-à-vis the EUR. They find evidence that 
currency co-movement is significantly driven by “the competitive influence” of major currencies 
                                                  
21 In practice, the BoC monitored changes in the level of the CAD/USD and did not monitor option markets. 16   
on minor ones.
22 Currency co-movement is potentially important to the analysis of the effectiveness 
of intervention,  especially since we focus on unilateral intervention conducted in a small, open 
economy aimed at managing a minor currency vis-à-vis a major currency. For example, if the CAD 
appreciates against the USD following a CAD purchase intervention, this event will appear 
effective according to the “direction” criterion. If the USD is depreciating against other currencies 
in general, however, there is little reason to believe that the USD depreciation can be ascribed to 
the unilateral BoC intervention. In order to address this concern, we carry out both the daily data 
and the high-frequency analysis of effectiveness using a “filtered” CAD/USD exchange rate as well 
as using the “raw” CAD/USD rate. The filtered CAD/USD is calculated as the difference between 
the percentage change in the CAD/USD and the percentage change in an equal-weighted basket of 
the GBP/USD, DEM/USD, and JPY/USD exchange rates.23 Figure 2 shows the evolution of the 
“raw” CAD/USD against the equally weighted basket of the DEM/USD, GBP/USD, and JPY/USD 
exchange rates, where both are indexed to 100 as of the start of January 1995. 
We use three formal tests to determine the statistical significance of our results. The first is the non-
parametric sign test. It verifies whether the observed number of successes, based on the “direction,” 
“smoothing,” or “volatility” criteria following intervention events, are random or systematic. With 
reference to the “direction” criterion for success, the null hypothesis is that the probability of 
observing a positive value (success) is the same as that of observing a negative value (no success), 
hence the underlying probability parameter is 0.5. In other words, the random variable X (equal to 
the number of positive values, or “successes”) among  n sample observations has a binomial 
                                                  
22 As Eun and Lai (2004) point out, despite the vast research in co-movement of other asset prices, such as bonds and 
stocks, the potentially highly important issue of currency co-movement has not been given much attention in the 
academic literature. 
23 In both analyses, we vary the weights when calculating the filtered exchange rate as additional robustness checks, 
without detecting qualitatively different results. For brevity, we report only the results based on equal weights. 17   
distribution with m = 0.5. A significant sign test indicates that the observed number of successes is 
not a random finding attributable to the equal probability of appreciation or depreciation. For 
details on this test in event studies, see MacKinlay (1997).
24  
The second test is the non-parametric rank test. It is applied only to the high-frequency analysis; 
the smaller number of events in the daily data analysis precludes this test. The third test is the 
matched sample (difference-in-means) test. The matched sample test is associated with the 
“smoothing” criterion, since it indicates, at the minimum, smaller post-event CAD depreciation or 
appreciation, and it is applied to both the high-frequency and the daily data analysis. Since both 
additional tests confirm the results based on the sign test, for brevity we focus on the results from 
the first test.
25 
5.  Results of the Daily Data Analysis 
Table 2 provides details on intervention episodes from 1995 to 1998 when events are classified 
using daily data, 2-day pre- and post-event windows, and a maximum 5-day “tranquility” period. 
The second column of the table shows the direction of the intervention (in terms of purchases (P) or 
sales (S) of USD) for each event. The final four columns provide details on the behaviour of the 
CAD/USD in terms of the average daily percentage change and volatility during the pre- and post-
event windows. By comparing the direction of each intervention event (column 2) with the 
associated post-event exchange rate (column 4), success according to the “direction” criterion is 
assessed. Similarly, a comparison of direction of each intervention event with the average daily 
                                                  
24 See Fatum (2000) for a discussion of the choice of probability parameters associated with the “direction” and the 
“smoothing” criteria for success. 
25 For details on the rank test in event studies, see Campbell and Wasley (1993) and MacKinlay (1997). See, for 
example, Ben-Horim and Levy (1984, 458) for details on the matched sample test and Fatum and Hutchison (2003a, b) 
for applications. 18   
percentage change in CAD/USD before (column 3) and after each event (column 4) addresses the 
issue of  success according to the “smoothing” criterion.  Finally,  success according to the 
“volatility” criterion  is assessed  by comparing pre-event volatility (column 5) with post-event 
volatility (column 6). 
We identify 58 separate intervention events over the 1995 to 1998 period, of which 27 lasted for 
multiple days. Table 2 shows that the direction of the change in the exchange rate during the post-
event window was consistent with the direction of the associated intervention in 28 events and, 
accordingly, inconsistent in 30 events. Put differently, 28 of the 58 events were successful 
according to the “direction” criterion; 5 4 of the 58 events  were successful according to the 
“smoothing” criterion. Comparing the 2 -day pre-event volatility  with the 2 -day post-event 
volatility, 26 events were associated with  decreased post-event volatility and 32 events were 
associated with increased post-event volatility. The following sections  report the results of the 
formal tests. 
5.1  Direction results 
Figure 3  shows the results of the sign test based on the “direction” criterion with the underlying 
probability parameter of 0.50. Each column represents the number of successes based on a different 
window length, with pre- and post-event windows ranging from 1 to 10 business days. The 2-day 
pre- and post-event windows shown in Table 2 are associated with the second column in Figure 3. 
In Figures 3(a)-(f), the horizontal line shows the number of successes necessary to reject a random 19   
outcome at the 95 per cent significance level.
26 Figures 3(a)-(c) summarize the findings based on 
all 58 events for the “raw” CAD/USD exchange rate, and Figures 3(d)-(f) summarize the findings 
based on the same 58 events for the “filtered” CAD/USD rate that controls for currency co-
movements against the USD. Figure 3(a) shows evidence in support of effectiveness at window 
lengths of 3  through 7 days and again at 9 days, as the associated  bars reach (or exceed) the 
horizontal line (at 36 successes out of 58). Figure 3(d) shows evidence in support of effectiveness 
at window lengths of 3, 4, and 8 days. Clearly, adjusting for the co-movements of major currencies 
against the USD weakens the results in support of effectiveness, yet we still reject the null 
hypothesis that the observed number of successes is random across all window lengths. 
As noted earlier, the sample period under study is of particular interest, because it comprises two 
intervention regimes: a mechanistic regime through mid-April 1995 and a mixed regime featuring 
both mechanistic and discretionary intervention from mid-April 1995 to September 1998. 
Mechanistic intervention operations, whether carried out under the first or the second regime, are 
likely to have been anticipated by market participants, whereas discretionary intervention 
operations carried out under the second regime had the potential of surprising the markets and, 
therefore, have a stronger impact (see Murray, Zelmer, and McManus 1997). In order to investigate 
this possibility, we redo the analysis on subsamples of events associated with mechanistic 
intervention and events associated with discretionary intervention separately.
27  
                                                  
26 For ease of exposition, only the horizontal bar associated with the 95 per cent significance level is shown. Given the 
limited number of daily events, effectiveness assessed according to the 90 per cent significance level, instead, does not 
dramatically increase the described support for effectiveness. 
27 Two events contain both mechanistic and discretionary intervention transactions, and these are classified as 
mechanistic events, for convenience. 20   
Figures 3(b) and (e) show the results of the analysis of the 43 mechanistic intervention events using 
the “raw” and the “filtered” CAD/USD exchange rate, respectively. Based on the “raw” CAD/USD 
rate, five of the bars shown in Figure 3(b) reach (or exceed) the horizontal line (at 28 successes out 
of 43), which suggests that intervention is systematically associated with success according to the 
“direction” criterion. Focusing instead on  Figure 3(e) and the “filtered” rate, significance at the 
95 per cent level is found only at the 4-day window length. Figures 3(c) and (f) show the analysis 
of the 15 discretionary events. We find that none of the bars reaches (or exceeds) the horizontal line 
(at 12 successes out of 15), potentially due to the test’s low degrees of freedom. Therefore, we find 
no significant evidence in support of effectiveness when analyzing discretionary intervention 
events. 
5.2  Smoothing results 
Figure 4  shows the results based on the “smoothing” criterion where the sign test is based on an 
underlying probability parameter of 0.75 for pre- and post-event window lengths ranging from 1 to 
10 days. Figures 4(a) and (d) summarize the findings based on all 58 events for the “raw” and the 
“filtered” CAD/USD rate, respectively. Figure 4(a) shows that the observed number of successes is 
statistically significant at the 95 per cent level (at 50 or more successes out of 58) for window 
lengths of 1, 2 , 3, 6, and 9 days. When analyzing the “filtered” rate, the observed number of 
successes is not significant at any window length, which  suggests that currency co-movements 
against the USD do matter for our results.  Figures 4(b) and (e) show the results based on the 
43 mechanistic events,  and Figures 4(c) and (f) show the results based on the 15 discretionary 
events. The subsample results are similar to those based on the full sample, showing some support 
for success according to “smoothing” when using the “raw” CAD/USD rate; no support for success 
is found when using the “filtered” CAD/USD rate.  21   
5.3  Volatility results 
Figure 5 shows the results for the comparison of pre-event versus post-event volatility for pre- and 
post-event window lengths ranging from 1 to 10 days. The sign test determines whether the 
observed number of events associated with decreased CAD/USD volatility is random or 
systematically associated with intervention events. The test has an underlying probability parameter 
of 0.50; thus, the horizontal 95 per cent lines for Figures 5(a)-(f) are (pairwise) identical to the 
significance lines for the sign test results of “direction,” as Figures 3(a)-(f) show. 
Figures 5(a)-(f)  report the results of these tests. Despite  engaging  in  intervention  designed to  
maintain orderly markets for the CAD/USD, there is no support for the hypothesis that volatility 
decreases following an intervention episode. Figures 5(a)-(c) show that the volatility of the “raw” 
CAD/USD does not systematically decrease, whether investigating all events together or the 
subsamples of mechanistic and discretionary interventions separately. As  Figures 5(d)-(f) show, 
netting out the impact of currency co-movements against the USD does not change this conclusion. 
In sum, there are no instances of window lengths where the associated number of decreased post-
event volatility reaches the level of statistical significance. 
Because some studies find that intervention is systematically associated with increased volatility, 
we also test this possibility (results not shown, for brevity).
28 We find evidence in support of 
increased volatility only when we analyze the full sample and the “raw” CAD/USD rate, and only 
for window lengths of 1 and 5 days. For all other window lengths, we accept the null hypothesis 
that the observed number of events associated with increased post-event volatility is random. When 
                                                  
28 See King (2003) for details on these studies. 22   
the CAD/USD rate is adjusted for currency co-movements against the USD, we reject the null 
hypothesis  only  at the 1 -day window length. Additionally, when analyzing the subsamples of 
mechanistic and discretionary intervention events separately, we reject the existence of a 
systematic link between intervention and increased volatility for all window lengths except one. In 
sum, our findings do not support the view that intervention is associated with increased exchange 
rate volatility when analyzing the daily data. 
5.4  Monetary policy changes and USD intervention by other central banks 
As pointed out by Fatum and Hutchison (2003a) and others, the event study methodology assumes 
that intervention defines the event and is not systematically related to other relevant economic 
news, such as monetary policy changes or USD intervention by other central banks. In principle, 
this is a concern in all event studies, but it is of particular concern in the context of our daily data 
analysis, where a large number of intervention episodes last for several days.  
In order to address this concern, we redo the analysis on subsamples of events that do not coincide 
with monetary policy changes conducted by either the BoC or the U.S. Federal Reserve. Table 3 
shows that there are only 12 days over the period under study when BoC intervention occurred on a 
day when the BoC changed the target for the overnight rate. There are no cases of CAD/USD 
intervention coinciding with changes in U.S. monetary policy.
29 Although the power of the tests is 
reduced, the daily data results described above are robust to the exclusion of these 1 2 events. 
                                                  
29 During our sample period, there were 28 days when only the Canadian overnight rate target changed, 2 days when 
only the target for the federal funds rate changed, and 4 days when monetary policy in both countries changed on the 
same day.  23   
Intervention in the DEM/USD or the JPY/USD by other major central banks coincides with 4 days 
of BoC intervention. Dropping these 4 events from the analysis does not impact our results.
30  
Sarno and Taylor (2001,  850) state that “[Intervention] policies which are inconsistent with the 
underlying stance of monetary and fiscal policy are doomed to ultimate failure.” When intervention 
is inconsistent with the direction of monetary policy, it may be viewed as unsustainable and lacking 
credibility. We checked whether intervention in the CAD was consistent with the direction of 
monetary policy by comparing the direction of intervention with the direction of changes in 
monetary policy over the s ame period. When monetary policy was tightening, purchases of the 
CAD would be consistent, whereas sales of the CAD would be inconsistent. When monetary policy 
was easing, the reverse would be true. We  find that there was no systematic pattern between 
intervention in the CAD and Canadian monetary policy, which suggests that the intervention in the 
CAD was not designed to target a level for the currency. See King (2003) for a discussion of  
different intervention strategies and objectives. 
6.  Results of the High-Frequency (Intraday) Data Analysis 
It is possible that some of the impact of intervention in the CAD/USD market is so short-lived that 
it cannot be detected using daily data. In order to investigate this possibility, this section analyzes 
intervention using a unique data set of high-frequency, official intervention data provided by the 
BoC, along with high-frequency exchange rate data (with quotes at a 5-minute frequency, 24 hours 
per day) obtained from Olsen and Associates. We apply the event study approach of the previous 
section to the analysis of the high-frequency intervention data, defining an event as a cluster of 
                                                  
30 As a further robustness check, the event definition was changed to allow for no more than 3 (instead of 5) days of 
“tranquility,” and the analysis was redone. This change of event definition affected only 5 events and did not affect the 
results. 24   
individual intervention transactions in one direction, interspaced by at most 30 minutes of no 
intervention.
31 
Using the high-frequency data and the 30-minute event definition, the BoC intervened in the 
CAD/USD exchange rate market on 321 separate events, 270 of which occurred within market 
hours (between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. EST). While the timing of intervention operations carried out 
within North American market hours is known, this is not the case for intervention operations that 
occurred outside of market hours. In order to make the most of our knowledge of the timing of 
intervention operations, we focus our high-frequency analysis on the 270 events that took place 
within market hours. 
6.1  Direction results 
Figure 6 shows the results from the sign test based on the “direction” criterion with the underlying 
probability parameter of 0.50 across all window lengths (5 through 120 minutes).
32 F or 
Figures 6(a)-(f), the horizontal line shows the number of successes necessary to reject randomness 
at the 95 per cent significance level. Figure 6(a) summarizes the findings based on all 270 events 
and the “raw” CAD/USD exchange rate, and Figure 6(d) summarizes the findings based on the 
same 270 events and the “filtered” CAD/USD rate. 
All the bars in Figure 6(a) reach or exceed the horizontal line (at 150 successes out of 270); thus, 
the null hypothesis that the observed number of successes is random is rejected (separately) for 
                                                  
31 As a robustness check, we changed the event definition and redid the analysis of section 6. Specifically, we defined 
an event as a cluster of individual intervention operations in one direction, interspaced by at most 60 (instead of 30) 
minutes of no intervention operations. Using this slightly altered event definition, 220 (instead of 270) within-market-
hours events are identified. These changes yielded qualitatively identical results.  
32 Due to the non-public nature of the BoC intervention data, the intervention volumes and the exact timing of events 
are not shown. 25   
each window length. Accordingly, the results shown in Figure 6(a) provide strong evidence that 
BoC intervention is associated in a highly significant and systematic way with intraday movements 
in the CAD/USD exchange rate. This finding conforms with the BoC consistently applying the 
non-intervention framework discussed in section 2. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the impact on the CAD/USD persists to the end of the 2-
hour post-event window, which suggests that the impact of intervention is longer than documented 
in other high-frequency studies. 
Turning to the analysis of the “filtered” exchange rate and Figure 6(d), the findings of significance 
at the 95 per cent level are repeated for window lengths of one hour or less. For both Figures 6(a) 
and (d), it is the case that the significance levels tend to drop as the window length increases. This 
finding suggests that part of the duration effects found when analyzing the “raw” exchange rate  
may be attributed to general movements in the USD, and not to intervention itself. 
As noted earlier, the sample period under study is of particular interest because it comprises two 
different intervention regimes, the first characterized by mechanistic intervention and the second 
characterized by both mechanistic and discretionary intervention. In order to investigate whether 
mechanistic and discretionary intervention events affect the market differently, the analysis is re-
done separately on the subsample of events associated with mechanistic intervention, and redone 
separately on the subsample of events associated with discretionary intervention.
33 
                                                  
33 Events containing both mechanistic and discretionary intervention transactions are classified as discretionary. 
Alternatively, dropping these “mixed” events from the analysis does not affect the results. 26   
Figures 6(b) and (e) show the results of the analysis of the 145 mechanistic events using the “raw” 
CAD/USD and the “filtered” CAD/USD exchange rates, respectively. Both figures repeat the 
patterns displayed for the full samples; i.e., when focusing on the “raw” exchange rate, intervention 
is significant at the 95 per cent level across all window lengths, whereas intervention is significant, 
at a minimum, at the 90 per cent level when focusing on the “filtered” exchange rate (not shown). 
Figures 6(c) and (f) show the results based on the discretionary events. Again, for almost all 
window lengths of one hour or less, it is the case that the null hypothesis of randomness is rejected 
at the 95 per cent significance level (at 73 successes or more out of 125). Somewhat surprisingly, 
there is no indication that discretionary intervention is, on average, associated with stronger effects 
than mechanistic intervention. In fact, when focusing on the window lengths that are longer than 
one hour, there is not a single instance of significant effects of discretionary intervention at the 
95 per cent level, and this is in contrast to the findings based on the subsample of only mechanistic 
events.
34 The previously observed pattern of lowered significance levels as the window lengths are 
expanded is repeated.  
In sum, the analysis based on the “direction” criterion of success shows that BoC intervention is 
significantly associated with intraday movements in the CAD/USD exchange rate and that the 
effects of intervention appear to be strongest when window  lengths of one hour or less are 
considered. Furthermore, the results imply that BoC intervention has a very similar intraday impact 
                                                  
34 It is noteworthy that the difference in sample sizes when comparing significance across mechanistic and 
discretionary events leads to different degrees of freedom of the sign test and, furthermore, that the success-to-failure 
ratio is very similar across the two subsamples. 
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on the CAD/USD exchange rate regardless of whether the intervention events are rules-based or 
discretionary. These results are consistent with the BoC following the intervention strategy 
described in section 2, with intervention continuing until the currency reversed direction. 
6.2  Smoothing results 
Figure 7 shows the results based on the “smoothing” criterion and the sign test with the underlying 
probability parameter of 0.75 across all window lengths. Figures 7(a) and (d) summarize the 
findings based on all 270 events and the “raw” CAD/USD and the “filtered” CAD/USD exchange 
rate, respectively. The observed number of successes is, of course, higher than the observed 
number of successes according to the “direction” criterion, by construction of the “smoothing” 
criterion that embodies the “direction” criterion; similarly, so is the number of successes necessary 
to reject the null hypothesis of randomness. Both Figures 7(a) and (d) show patterns very similar to 
the corresponding “direction” figures (Figures 6(a) and (d)), and repeat the findings of significance 
at the 95 per cent level for all window lengths when focusing on the “raw” exchange rate measure. 
The longer window lengths for both the “raw” and the “filtered” rate are generally associated with 
significance at the 90 per cent level or higher. 
Figures 7(b) and (e) (Figures 7(c) and (f)) show the results based on the 145 (125) mechanistic 
(discretionary) events; the findings are very similar to those based on the “direction” criterion. In 
particular, there is again no indication whatsoever that discretionary intervention is more effective 
than mechanistic intervention. Furthermore, Figure 7(f) shows that there are no significant effects 
of discretionary intervention at the 95 per cent level when focusing on the “filtered” exchange rate. 
For all these results, the effects are marginally weaker when removing general movements against 
the USD. 28   
6.3  Volatility results 
Figure 8  shows  the results  of the comparison of pre-event versus post-event volatility across 
window lengths of 30, 60, 90, and 120 minutes. In this context, the sign test determines whether the 
observed number of events associated with decreased CAD/USD volatility is random or 
systematically associated with intervention events. Consistent with the volatility analysis in Fatum 
and Hutchison (2003a), the test has an underlying probability parameter of 0.50. Therefore, the 
horizontal 95 per  cent significance lines for  Figures 8(a)-(f) are (pairwise) identical to the 
significance lines for the sign test results of the “direction” criterion, as shown in Figures 6(a)-(f). 
Focusing first on the analysis using the “raw” exchange rate, Figures 8(a)-(c) show that the number 
of events associated with decreased post-event volatility is high enough to reject randomness at 
conventional significance levels when 30- and 60-minute window lengths are investigated, while 
the number of successes according to the “volatility” criterion is too small to question randomness 
when the window lengths are expanded. In other words, the volatility effects of intervention are 
significant but short-lived, in that the effects are detectable only when comparing exchange rate 
movements within one hour before and after the events. This appears to be the case regardless of 
whether the subsamples of mechanistic and discretionary intervention are analyzed separately or 
whether all the events are analyzed jointly. 
Turning to the “filtered” exchange rate and the results  shown in  Figures 8(d)-(f), the pattern 
regarding lower significance levels as the window  lengths are expanded is repeated. For the 
analysis using the “filtered” exchange rate, however, none of the window lengths is associated in a 
significant and systematic way with intraday CAD/USD exchange rate volatility (none of the bars 
reaches the horizontal 95 per cent significance line),  which implies that the effects of intervention 29   
on volatility patterns within the first two hours around the described events are less robust than the 
effects of intervention on “discretion” and “smoothing.”
35 
7.  Discussion of Results 
Given that CAD intervention was not designed to target a level of the currency, the finding that 
intervention is associated with a systematic change in the direction of the CAD/USD may seem 
surprising. These results, however, are consistent with the operation of the intervention framework, 
where intervention might continue over days until the CAD/USD reversed direction.    
This effect of BoC intervention may reflect how markets perceived the “signal” communicated by 
intervention. For part of the period under study, monetary policy was being used explicitly by the 
BoC to rebalance monetary conditions in response to movements in the exchange rate. A large 
movement in the exchange rate would change the level of monetary conditions in the economy, and 
intervention could send confusing signals to market participants about the future direction of 
monetary policy. Such a situation occured in late 1996, when the appreciation of the CAD caused a 
dramatic tightening of monetary conditions at a time when the BoC was easing monetary policy. 
The BoC responded by cutting its overnight rate target on three occasions  in October and 
November 1996 to rebalance monetary conditions.
36 The BoC—having stayed out of the currency 
markets during this period—intervened to sell CAD on 5 November 1996, shortly before a rate cut 
was announced on 8 November. The timing of these events may have led foreign market 
                                                  
35 As noted previously, some studies find that intervention is systematically associated with increased volatility; 
therefore, our analysis also tested for this possibility. However, the observed number of events associated with 
increased volatility is random across all window lengths (30, 60, 90, and 120 minutes). 
36 The BoC took the exchange rate as given and responded with changes in the overnight interest rate to rebalance 
monetary conditions, with reference to a monetary conditions index (MCI).  30   
participants to believe that intervention was being used as a signal of future monetary policy 
changes. When the BoC next intervened to sell Canadian dollars, it immediately contacted market 
participants to explain that the intervention had no monetary policy implications.  
In short, financial market participants may have perceived that intervention was being used as a 
signal of future monetary policy changes, despite the fact that BoC intervention was not designed 
to send this signal. This episode  may suggest that intervention designed to maintain orderly 
markets could create uncertainty a bout monetary policy in a small, open economy. It also 
reinforces the importance of distinguishing between sterilized intervention operations designed to 
manage the exchange rate, and unsterilized money market operations involved in the conduct of 
monetary policy.  
8.  Conclusion 
This paper investigates the effectiveness of sterilized intervention in the CAD/USD exchange rate 
from 1995 to 1998 using official intervention data provided by the BoC. The data set is unique, 
because it consists of high-frequency (intraday) data with information on the timing and magnitude 
of each intervention operation at the transaction level. The time period studied covers two distinct 
intervention regimes—an earlier mechanistic regime where intervention was frequent and widely 
anticipated, and a revised regime that introduced more discretion on the timing of intervention, 
increased the intensity, and heightened the visibility. 
We use an event study framework to analyze the impact of intervention on exchange rates. Given 
that we are not studying a major currency, and that the CAD  may therefore be affected by large 
movements of the USD versus other major currencies, we check the robustness of our results by 
controlling for currency co-movements using a “filtered” CAD/USD that nets out movements in a 
basket of the DEM/USD, JPY/USD, and GBP/USD exchange rates.  31   
We find that intervention did not have a systematic impact on the volatility of the CAD/USD when 
aggregating intervention operations at the daily level. We find some evidence that intervention was 
systematically associated with both a change in the direction and a smoothing of the CAD/USD at 
this frequency. In particular, intervention had the desired effect of smoothing the exchange rate 
over periods of 1 to 3 business days following intervention events, whereas the CAD/USD would 
move in the same direction that intervention occurred over periods of 3 to 9 business days 
following intervention. These effects are weakened when controlling for currency co-movements 
against the USD, s uggesting that controlling for currency co-movements is important when 
assessing the effectiveness of intervention.  
Consistent with the results of Payne and Vitale (2003), we find evidence in support of effectiveness 
when analyzing intraday exchange rate returns (i.e., when focusing on the “direction” and the 
“smoothing” criteria of success) over the 5- through 120-minute windows. Additionally, we find 
some evidence that intervention is associated with a relatively short-lived reduction of exchange 
rate volatility. 
Contrasting the results of the analysis of rules-based events with the results of the analysis of the 
discretionary events does not suggest that discretionary intervention is more effective than rules-
based intervention. 32   
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 Table 1: Canadian Dollar Intervention Data, January 1995 – September 1998 
Panel A: Overview of daily data 
  Mechanistic  Discretionary  Total  Per cent 
Buy CAD  41  57  98  64.9 
Sell CAD  52  1  53  35.1 
Total  93  58  151  100.0 
Per cent  61.6  38.4  100.0   
 
Panel B: Frequency of daily intervention 










1995  67  0  26  41 
1996  9  4  9  4 
1997  17  20  30  7 
1998  0  34  33  1 
Total  93  58  98  53 
 
Panel C: Overview of intraday (high-frequency) data  
  Mechanistic  Discretionary  Total  Per cent 
Buy CAD  444  688  1,132  74.0 
Sell CAD  392  6  398  26.0 
Total  836  694  1,530  100.0 
Per cent  54.6  45.4  100.0   
 
Panel D: Frequency of intraday (high-frequency) intervention 






No. of buy 
CAD 
No. of sell 
CAD 
1995  39.9  611  0  321  290 
1996  5.9  41  49  77  13 
1997  23.3  184  173  268  89 
1998  30.8  0  472  466  6 
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Table 2: Overview of Intervention Events, January 1995 to September 1998 




or Sale (S) of 
USD 

























1  S  0.1956  -0.3181  0.000061  0.000140 
2  P  -0.3181  -0.1254  0.000199  0.000247 
3  S  0.3723  -0.2143  0.000202  0.000083 
4  P  -0.2143  0.0000  0.000162  0.000306 
5  S  0.0000  -0.2937  0.000294  0.000369 
6  P  -0.3230  0.2788  0.000308  0.000105 
7  S  0.0705  -0.5635  0.000258  0.000055 
8  P  -0.2023  -0.0918  0.000055  0.000267 
9  P  -0.3877  0.1399  0.000232  0.000081 
10  S  0.2649  0.0110  0.000103  0.000219 
11  P  -0.2620  0.2174  0.000224  0.000148 
12  P  -0.2310  0.1365  0.000167  0.000274 
13  S  0.1876  -0.1143  0.000274  0.000196 
14  S  0.3176  -0.4606  0.000029  0.000254 
15  P  -0.4606  -0.0294  0.000247  0.000226 
16  P  -0.4606  -0.1196  0.000220  0.000262 
17  S  0.1601  -0.2127  0.000054  0.000257 
18  P  -0.1860  0.2621  0.000223  0.000260 
19  S  0.4037  -0.0732  0.000232  0.000448 
20  P  -0.1468  0.3219  0.000166  0.000248 
21  S  0.4158  -0.1106  0.000242  0.000337 
22  S  0.3562  0.0653  0.000272  0.000242 
23  P  -0.5507  -0.0699  0.000265  0.000218 
24  P  -0.1031  -0.1329  0.000142  0.000276 
25  S  0.2107  -0.1706  0.000231  0.000088 
26  P  -0.4134  0.2113  0.000264  0.000243 
27  S  0.2212  0.1122  0.000275  0.000276 
28  S  0.1469  0.0330  0.000233  0.000238 
29  S  0.0219  -0.0036  0.000216  0.000264 
30  S  0.2668  0.0438  0.000210  0.000101 
31  P  -0.1426  -0.0073  0.000244  0.000192 
32  P  -0.0675  -0.0300  0.000121  0.000245 
33  S  0.1744  -0.0958  0.000162  0.000087 
                           (continued) 36   
Table 2: Overview of Intervention Events, January 1995 to September 1998 (concluded) 




or Sale (S) 
of USD 




2 days 1 



















34  P  -0.6338  -0.0821  0.000196  0.000305 
35  S  0.1193  0.0967  0.000269  0.000198 
36  S  0.1355  0.0365  0.000260  0.000259 
37  S  0.2227  0.3481  0.000114  0.000268 
38  S  0.0792  0.0108  0.000240  0.000178 
39  P  -0.3022  -0.2969  0.000196  0.000190 
40  P  -0.2574  -0.1202  0.000210  0.000320 
41  S  0.2604  -0.0217  0.000155  0.000276 
42  S  0.2890  0.0793  0.000242  0.000065 
43  S  0.1009  -0.4813  0.000234  0.000413 
44  S  0.1720  0.0143  0.000192  0.000199 
45  S  0.3076  -0.0355  0.000083  0.000190 
46  S  0.3193  -0.0178  0.000240  0.000086 
47  S  0.1228  -0.2292  0.000255  0.000210 
48  S  0.0597  -0.3849  0.000183  0.000230 
49  S  0.1922  0.0245  0.000194  0.000267 
50  P  -0.1473  0.3725  0.000267  0.000037 
51  S  0.0243  -0.1723  0.000215  0.000097 
52  S  0.2584  0.2605  0.000117  0.000239 
53  S  0.3911  0.2068  0.000231  0.000230 
54  S  0.1821  0.0240  0.000122  0.000207 
55  S  0.2624  0.0782  0.000214  0.000185 
56  S  0.2154  0.1176  0.000179  0.000219 
57  S  0.2415  -1.1700  0.000243  0.000711 
58  S  -0.4189  0.0393  0.000414  0.000352 
1. Average daily percentage change in the daily CAD/USD over the two business days prior to (after) first (last) day of 
the event. 
2. Volatility of the percentage change in the high-frequency CAD/USD over the two business days prior to (after) the 
first (last) day of the event. 37   









Purchase (P) or 
Sale (S) of 
USD 
10-Jan-95  0.50  6.00  S 
12-Jan-95  0.50  6.50  S 
17-Jan-95  0.50  7.00  S 
16-Feb-95  0.50  8.00  S 
10-Jul-95  -0.25  6.75  P 
28-Aug-95  -0.25  6.25  P 
31-Oct-95  -0.25  6.00  P 
25-Jan-96  -0.25  5.50  S 
18-Apr-96  -0.25  4.75  S 
12-Dec-97  0.50  4.25  S 
30-Jan-98  0.50  4.75  S 
27-Aug-98  1.00  5.75  S 
 
Note: There was no intervention coinciding with changes in U.S. monetary policy over this period. 
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Figure 2: Index of Canadian Dollar vs. Net Change in Basket of German Deutsche Mark, 
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Figure 3: Success of Intervention Using Daily Data — Direction Criterion 
This figure shows the results for the sign test based on the “direction” criterion with the underlying 
probability parameter of 0.50. Intervention is a success when the CAD/USD moves in the direction 
of intervention after the event. Each column represents the number of successes based on a 
different window length, ranging from 1 to 10 business days. For all Figures 3(a)-(f), the horizontal 
line shows the number of successes necessary for rejecting a random outcome at the 95 per cent 
significance level. Figures  3(a)-(c) summarize the findings using the “raw” CAD/USD,  and 
Figures 3(d)-(f) summarize the findings using the “filtered” CAD/USD. 
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Figure 4: Success of Intervention Using Daily Data — Smoothing Criterion 
This figure  shows the results for the sign test based on the “smoothing” criterion with the 
underlying probability parameter of 0.75. Intervention is a success when the CAD/USD changes 
direction due to intervention, or  when the rate of change of the CAD/USD is slower following 
intervention. Each column represents the number of successes based on a different window length, 
ranging from 1 to 10 business days. For all Figures 4(a)-(f), the horizontal line shows the number 
of successes necessary  for rejecting  a random outcome at the 95 per cent significance level. 
Figures 4(a)-(c) summarize the findings using the “raw” CAD/USD,  and  Figures  4(d)-(f) 
summarize the findings using the “filtered” CAD/USD. 
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Figure 5: Success of Intervention Using Daily Data — Volatility Criterion 
This figure shows the results for the sign test based on the “volatility” criterion with the underlying 
probability parameter of 0.50. Intervention is a success when volatility decreases from before to 
after the event. Each column represents the number of successes based on a different window 
length, ranging from 1 to 10 business days. For all Figures 5(a)-(f), the horizontal line shows the 
number of successes necessary for rejecting a random outcome at the 95 per cent significance level. 
Figures  5(a)-(c) summarize the findings using the “raw” CAD/USD,  and F igures  5(d)-(f) 
summarize the findings using the “filtered” CAD/USD. 
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Figure 6: Success of Intervention Using High-Frequency Data — Direction Criterion 
This figure shows the results for the sign test based on the “direction” criterion with the underlying 
probability parameter of 0.50. Intervention is a success when the CAD/USD moves in the direction 
of intervention after the event. Each column represents the number of successes based on a 
different window length, ranging from 5 to 120 minutes. For all Figures 6(a)-(f), the horizontal line 
shows the number of successes necessary  for rejecting  a random outcome at the 95 per cent 
significance level. Figures  6(a)-(c) summarize the findings using the “raw” CAD/USD,  and 
Figures 6(d)-(f) summarize the findings using the “filtered” CAD/USD. 
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Figure 7: Success of Intervention Using High-Frequency Data — Smoothing Criterion 
This figure  shows the results for the sign test based on the “smoothing” criterion with the 
underlying probability parameter of 0.75. Intervention is a success when the CAD/USD changes 
direction due to intervention, or  when the rate of change of the CAD/USD is slower following 
intervention. Each column represents the number of successes based on a different window length, 
ranging from 5 to 120 minutes. For all Figures  7(a)-(f), the horizontal line shows the number of 
successes necessary for rejecting a random outcome at the 95 per cent significance level. Figures 
7(a)-(c) summarize the findings using the “raw” CAD/USD, and Figures 7(d)-(f) summarize the 
findings using the “filtered” CAD/USD. 
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Figure 8: Success of Intervention Using High-Frequency Data — Volatility Criterion 
This figure shows the results for the sign test based on the “volatility” criterion with the underlying 
probability parameter of 0.50. Intervention is a success when volatility decreases from before to 
after the event. Each column represents the number of successes based on a different window 
length, ranging from 0.5 hours to 2 hours. For all Figures 8(a)-(f), the horizontal line shows the 
number of successes necessary for rejecting a random outcome at the 95 per cent significance level. 
Figures  8(a)-(c) summarize the findings using the “raw” CAD/USD,  and  Figures  8(d)-(f) 
summarize the findings using the “filtered” CAD/USD. 
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